Incentive regulation, benchmarking and utility performance /
Salvato in:
| Autore principale: | |
|---|---|
| Enti autori: | , |
| Natura: | Libro |
| Lingua: | English |
| Pubblicazione: |
Dickson, A.C.T. :
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission,
2000.
|
| Serie: | Utility Regulators Forum discussion paper.
Utility Regulators Forum discussion paper |
| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | http://www.accc.gov.au/utipubreg/pubreg.htm |
Sommario:
- Performance measurement
- Introduction
- Productivity
- Partial productivity
- Total factor productivity (TFP)
- Data envelopment analysis (DEA)
- Stochastic frontier analysis
- Productivity measurement in electricity
- The overall price level
- The structure of prices
- Pricing in electricity
- Financial viability
- Service quality
- Approaches to regulation
- Rate-of-return (or cost-of-service) regulation
- Price and revenue capping - origins and objectives
- Implementation problems of CP1-X
- Establishing the initial situation
- Extent of initial cost recovery
- Extent of cost inefficiency
- Inefficiency of the structure of prices
- The setting of X
- The regulatory period (re-setting X) and the 'glide path
- Service quality
- Overall assessment
- Yardstick regulation
- Conclusions
- Performance measurement and regulation are related
- Performance measurement is difficult but advancing
- Pricing structure is important
- Not all regulation is incentive regulation
- Cap prices not revenue
- Importance of X
- Timing of regulatory re-sets is important
- WACC and DORC are difficult to avoid
- Yardstick regulation is informationally demanding.