North Korean paradoxes : circumstances, costs, and consequences of Korean unification /
Analyzes economic, political, and security issues associated with Korean unification. Considers how the North Korean system might unravel, leading to possible unification would be under differing circumstances and assumptions. Compares points of relevance and nonrelevance between the German experien...
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| Language: | English |
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Santa Monica, CA :
RAND Corporation,
2005.
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Table of Contents:
- Machine derived contents note: Table Of Contents
- Preface iii
- Table of Figures vii
- Table of Tables ix
- Summary xi
- Acronyms xix
- I. Preamble: Purpose And Roadmap 1
- Ii. North Korea: Obscurities And Paradoxes 3
- 1. Obscurities 3
- 2. Paradoxes 6
- Iii. Size, Growth, And Structure Of The North Korean Economy 9
- 1. Data problems 9
- 2. The North Korean GDP 10
- 3. Structural characteristics of North Korea's economy 13
- Iv. How Might The System Unravel: Scenarios For Reunification 21
- 1. Diminished attention to reunification 21
- 2. Three reunification scenarios 22
- A. Unification through system evolution and
- integration 22
- B. Unification by collapse and absorption 23
- C. Unification through conflict 24
- V. The Capital Costs Of Korean Reunification: Estimation And
- Management 27
- 1. Fluctuating interest and disinterest in reunification 27
- 2. Simulation and uncertainties 29
- Preamble 29
- The Model and Uncertainties 30
- A. Simulation results 38
- B. Distributing the costs of Korean reunification 43
- Vi. Other Estimates Of Reunification Costs 47
- 1. Differing sources and types of cost estimates 47
- 2. The wide range of reunification costs 47
- Vii. Is Germany'S Reunification Experience Relevant? 53
- 1. Relevance and non-relevance 53
- 2. Germany's reunification costs 54
- 3. Germany's military unification experience 57
- Viii. Conclusions: Effects On Korean Security Policies And
- Programs 63
- 1. WMD capabilities and programs 64
- 2. Korea's alliance with the U.S. 65
- Appendix A: A Simple Simulation Model for Sizing Korean
- Reunification Costs 67
- References 69
- Table Of Figures
- Figure 1; North Korea's Imports, Exports, and Trade Deficits, 1960-
- 2001 (in millions of U.S. dollars) 17
- Figure 2; Sensitivity of Cost Estimates to Preunification North Korean
- GDP (subject to variations in Institutional Reform Strategy,
- (Irs)) 41
- Figure 3; Sensitivity of Cost Estimates to Varying Incremental Capital
- Coefficients (ICOR) 42
- Figure 4; Sensitivity of Cost Estimates to Pace of Institutional
- Reform (IRS) 42
- Figure 5; Sensitivity of Cost Estimates to Speed of Doubling North
- Korean GDP 43
- Table Of Tables
- Table 1 North Korean and South Korean Gross Domestic Products, 2002
- (in Korean won and U.S. dollars) 11
- Table 2 North and South Korean GDP Growth Rates, 1990-2002 (in
- percentage per year) 12
- Table 3 Incremental Capital-Output Ratios (ICOR) and GDP Growth in
- East Asian Countries 33
- Table 4 Estimates of Reunification Costs: Selected Simulation Results
- (assuming 4-year doubling of North Korean GDP) 40
- Table 5 Other Estimates of Reunification Costs 51
- Table 6 Military Forces and Military Burden in South and North Korea
- 59.