Social choice mechanisms /

Social choice mechanisms /

Guardat en:
Dades bibliogràfiques
Autor principal: Danilov, V. I. (Vladimir Ivanovich), 1943-
Altres autors: Sotskov, A. I. (Aleksandr Ivanovich)
Format: eBook
Idioma:English
Publicat: Berlin ; New York : Springer, c2002.
Col·lecció:Studies in economic design
Matèries:
Social choice > Mathematical models.
Taula de continguts:
  • 1. Basic Concepts
  • Social Choice Correspondences
  • Monotone Social Choice Correspondences
  • Social Choice Mechanisms
  • Effectivity Functions and Blockings
  • 2. Nash-consistent Mechanisms
  • Definitions and Examples
  • Blockings Generated by Consistent Mechanisms
  • Strongly Monotone Social Choice Correspondences
  • Nash-implementable Correspondences
  • Implementation: the Case of Two Participants
  • Acceptable Mechanisms
  • 3. Strategy-proof Mechanisms
  • Dominant Strategies. The Revelation Principle
  • Single-Peaked Environment
  • Linear Environment
  • The Transferable Environment. Groves Mechanisms
  • Further Properties of Groves Mechanisms
  • 4. Cores and Stable Blockings
  • Stable Outcomes
  • Additive Blockings
  • Convex Blockings
  • Almost Additive Blockings
  • Necessary Stability Conditions
  • Veto as a Decision-making Procedure
  • 5. Strongly Consistent Mechanisms
  • Definitions and Examples
  • A Tokens Mechanism (or Veto-mechanism).
  • Blockings Generated by SC-mechanisms
  • Direct Core Mechanisms
  • Laminable Blockings
  • A Necessary and Sufficient Condition of Laminability
  • Neutral Laminable Blockings.

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